Qihoo 360 Technology Co. Ltd. (QIHU:NYSE) - Case Study in Valuation
First ....back to basics...... "Book value is an accounting term that measures the capital, including retained earnings, that has been put into a business. Intrinsic value is a present-value estimate of the cash that can be taken out of a business during its remaining life." Warren Buffett annual letter to Shareholders - 1993
All citations refer to the SEC document links below. Here are the bullet points:
1.)QIHU went public in 2010 - US$60 million in revenues & $8mm profits. Prior to the IPO there were really no assets (US$87 million), common equity (US$$2 million) or book value (US 89 cents per share) to speak of in relation to the size of the US$230 million IPO. (424(b)4 filed 3/29/2011, p 41-43)
2.) The disclosures in the same prospectus: They are the 3rd largest "Internet Company" in China with 339 million Monthly Active Users (MAU) (p51) with an 85% market penetration. (iResearch) Apparently, the two companies ahead of them split up the other 15% of the market and somehow became much larger than OIHU?
3.) Business structure is a Cayman Islands VIE with 3 Hong Kong subs, and a PRC (Peoples Republic of China) sub (Qizhi Software). Qizhi has contractual relationships with seven (7) other VIE's which conduct substantially all of the company's business in the PRC. These VIE's are owned by Mr. Hongyi Zhou, chairman & CEO and Mr. Xiangdong Qi, director and president & other key employees and investors. (p 79)
4.) At the time of the IPO cash infusion of $230 million......to facilitate the IPO, QIHU made an immediate 10 year loan loan to the officers of the company for US$12.1 million (p81) terms were not disclosed.
5.) After the IPO, the Stock price has gone from from US$30 per ADS to US$120 in March 2014 back to US$58 today.....i.e mkt cap of US$5B to US$19B back to US$9B
6.)Now, lets fast forward to the 9/30/14 quarterly numbers/balance sheet. (6K filing 11/24/14) Huge revenues (US$960 million in 9 months) But unfortunately, they've made relatively little money since the IPO; US$147 million over the 3 years through the (audited) 12/31/13 numbers and another US$150 million in the (un-audited) 9 months ended 9/30/14. Total - US$300 Million.
7.) The 9/30/14 numbers have a few odd ratios:
- Revenue per MAU grew to an annualized rate of $2.50/MAU in September of 2014, from $1.40/MAU in 2013 and only 17 cents/MAU at the time of the 2010 IPO. This is a significant, unexplained increase in revenue per MAU.
- Cost of Revenues held relatively constant at about 12% from 2010 through 2013. COR ballooned to 21% for the 9 month period ended 9/30/14. There was no explanation offered.
- Revenue more than doubled year over year (US$960 Million v US$450 Million), yet the company's operating metrics remained (with the exception of SmartSafe) relatively flat. Revenue and profit margins by product line were not disclosed.
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- The flat Metrics simply do not reflect a doubling in Revenue.
8.) The balance sheet also ballooned since the IPO. As of 9/30/14 total assets were US$3.1 Billion. There are two main reasons for this increase. 1.) The company had two bond issues; US$600 million in September of 2013 and a second issue of US$1 billion in September of 2014 (Total US$1.6 Billion) AND 2.) The company "wrote up" intangible assets by more than US$500 million in the un-audited 9 month period ending 9/30/14. There were no acquisitions disclosed.
9.) The bonds were issued at terms that IMO were a dream come true for the company......Notes due in 2020 and 2021 with .5% and 1.75% interest payable semi annually in arrears (lower interest rates than US Treasuries) with a conversion price at the equivalent of $120/ADS (at a current ADS price of $58/share this conversion option is relatively worthless). I would be less than thrilled if I were an investor that purchased these bonds at face. These were private issue sec 144 securities issued to qualified institutional buyers.
10.) Here are the write-ups of the Intangibles (12/31/13 v 9/30/14). Land Use Rights (US$75 Million v US$140 Million); Goodwill (US$26 Million v US$203 Million); Intangible Assets (US$93 million v US$180 Million); Long Term Investments (US$84 Million v US$290 Million) Other Long Term Assets (US$41 Million v US$47 Million) Total (US$319 Million v $860 Million) or a total write up of US$540 million increase in 9 months. These items were "relatively" unchanged and immaterial prior to the 9/30/14. Rapidly increasing Intangible Assets are a red flag indicating inflated earnings. i.e. funds spent that should have been recorded as an expense are carried on the balance as an asset to "manage/improve" profits..
11.) So let's do an exercise I always find extremely valuable. It involves "top side what if's" and usually gives a nice view of the Intrinsic Value of a business. Total Assets on the Balance Sheet of QIHU as of September 2014 were $3.1 Billion. Let's give management the financial benefit of having all of that capital without any of the cost, and we can see what the balance sheet would look like under ideal circumstances. We'll start with the $3.1 Billion in assets and reverse the cash proceeds from the bond issue (US$1.6 Billion) and the IPO (US$230 million) and write off the magically increasing "intangibles" (US$860 million). That gives us Adjusted/Real Assets of US$410 Million. Since QIHU didn't pay any dividends, we should have about US$410 million in Cash/assets left for shareholders......makes sense?....now we look at the remaining liabilities on the balance sheet (after removing the $1.6B in bonds)....these are roughly is $500 million. The company actually has a negative net worth of about US$100 Million. So after 4 years, without all of these capital transactions, this company would be insolvent, didn't flow a dime of cash to it's shareholders and the reported $300 million income number ($150 million of this income occurred in the un-audited 9 months ending 9/30/14) is actually due solely to the US$860 million write up of intangible assets.
12.) On 10/3/14 the Company has also authorized US$200 Million share buyback. The details re: which shares would be purchased and the per share purchase amount(s) were not disclosed.
13.) the coup de grĂ¢ce is that last week QIHU announced a joint venture with Cool Pad (2369:HK) a relatively small mobile device company bumping along with earnings of US$50 million a year and a market CAP of US$800 million according to Bloomberg & Yahoo Finance. QIHU will contribute US$409 Million for a 49% stake in the Joint Venture.
14.) So, even though QIHU has never created any value for ADS Shareholders, they are spending US$600 Million in the relatively near future on a share repurchase (probably designed to benefit insiders) and a "surprise" Joint Venture, betting half of the company's current (overstated) equity, not contemplated or discussed in any prior filings.
15.) Management's new end-game seems to be to pile as much US cash into the company as quickly as possible and spend it on Chinese Joint Ventures/acquisitions and insider compensation. I'd fully expect this business to "go dark" or be taken private at a substantial discount , like so many of these VIE's have done in the past, now that they've got their hands on all of this cash. (e.g.China Sky One Medical Inc., AutoChina, SinoTech Energy Limited and China MediaExpress, etc.)
Given the above, let's get back to the initial question....."What is the Intrinsic Value of QIHU?"
After reviewing the filings, there seems to be little, if any, possibility that any cash will ever be made available to Common/ADS Shareholders. Unfortunately, the sole purpose of this enterprise is, apparently, to line the pockets of insiders. Therefore the Intrinsic Value of this business, and the corresponding share value is US$0.00.
6-K 9/30/14 - Condensed statement of Cash flows & Balance Sheet
IPO Filing 424b4
Bond issue
Coolpad - $450 million joint venture
$200 million Share buy back 10/3/14
Hi Deepthroat, I just discovered your blog yesterday after noticing your comment on the Bronte Capital post about Alibaba and have started reading through your posts with much interest. There is a very small Australian listed company (mkt cap AUD 245m) that I believe to be overvalued. I also believe that the management could be manipulating earnings by inflating intangible assets and certainly lining their pockets at the expense of shareholders. Is it possible to send you an email with some of my findings? I would really appreciate if you could have a look and offer your opinion.
ReplyDeleteThank you,
SHA
Thanks SHA. I'd be hesitant to review a small Aussie business only because I don't know how much relevant information might be freely/publicly available. If you'd feel comfortable sharing the name of the business I'll see what I can find out.
DeleteThank you for your reply DT. The company name is 3P Learning (3PL.AX) You can find all announcements to the market including Annual Reports for free on asx.com.au. Links are below.
DeleteThe company IPO'd in 2014 at $2.50 which was an astonishingly high valuation given the earnings. The price has fallen to ~$1.85 and currently has statutory earnings of only 3c per share.
2014 Announcements
http://www.asx.com.au/asx/statistics/announcements.do?by=asxCode&asxCode=3pl&timeframe=Y&year=2014
2015 Announcements
http://www.asx.com.au/asx/statistics/announcements.do?by=asxCode&asxCode=3pl&timeframe=Y&year=2015
Some issues that may exist are:
* Corporate Governance and Board Independence or more aptly lack of Governance & Independence.
* CEO is rewarded short term performance bonus based on pro-forma numbers which are obviously not compliant to any accounting standards and much easier to manipulate.
* Insiders have taken a lot cash out of this based on a pre-ipo dividend, share bonuses and subsequent on market sales of stock
*Earnings quality doesn't seem great. Receivables increased 47%. 22% or about 1 in 5 of every dollar they are waiting on being paid are 'past due but not impaired'.
* Balance sheet has seen a large increase in intangible assets.
* They have made several acquisitions with very little disclosure about what exactly they are buying in terms of revenues, costs etc. In particular they purchased WHATIPH Consultants which has a registered address located in a residential housing suburb in South Africa. The cost was approx $1.8m of which $1.5m was booked as goodwill.
* Employee expenses have grown faster than revenues.
* They claim to be a 'growth' company yet strangely implemented a tiny dividend and set up a DRP whilst stating that they may not continue with dividends in the future as they require cash for growth opportunities.
The list goes on. I'm not sure where on the spectrum this company sits from outright fraudulent to just another minnow trying earnestly to do their best. Given all these 'potential issues' I'm not even sure where to start with regards to analysing this in a coherent structured way. I would be extremely grateful if you did have a look although given the size and location of the company, I can appreciate that it's not a high priority for you.
Thanks
SHA
Hi DT,
ReplyDeleteJust wanted to give you an update on the stock 3P Learning. It has become more interesting since I wrote last time. The company just announced HY15 results on Friday. On 11th January, 5 weeks before Friday the longstanding CEO, the same one who was dumping stock and taking cash out of the business since it listed, quit unexpectedly with no transition or handover period. The stock fell 17% but managed to climb back up over the 5 week period so that it was only down 4% from the day prior to the CEO quitting. Then on Friday, results were released and as you would expect they were pretty ordinary and stock was sold off 25%.
As I mentioned before, I would be extremely grateful to get your opinion on the stock and was hoping the recent events may spark your interest in it.
Thanks
SHA
SHA, I'm so sorry, I never noticed this post until now. It was buried in the blog and I've been swamped. I'll take a quick look at 3P Learning when I have a chance and give you my thoughts. Again, my apologies.
Delete